Negligence: Landlord May Not Create Trap on Premises and Induce Tenant to Use It to His Injury: Limits of Simple Tool Doctrine by Uhlar, George J.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 12
Issue 2 February 1928 Article 12
Negligence: Landlord May Not Create Trap on
Premises and Induce Tenant to Use It to His Injury:
Limits of Simple Tool Doctrine
George J. Uhlar
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
George J. Uhlar, Negligence: Landlord May Not Create Trap on Premises and Induce Tenant to Use It to His Injury: Limits of Simple Tool
Doctrine, 12 Marq. L. Rev. 170 (1928).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol12/iss2/12
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
'That every driver on overtaking any vehicle shall pass on the left
side thereof, and the driver overtaken shall with as much speed as
possible, upon the signal of the oncoming driver, drive to the right of
the center of the road so as to allow a free passage on the left, and
if necessary, because of the condition of the road, stop long enough
for the other party to pass.' This statute says nothing about signals
when passing or turning left on the highway.
The court goes on the theory that the driver behind can see what
is ahead of him and knows, that unless he gives a signal of his intention
to pass that the party ahead has a right to turn to the left. The court
also says that a traffic officer4 should know the rules of the road and
that he knows that if he gives warning of his intention to pass the
machine ahead that the driver is required by law to give him half of
the road. They base their decision on the case of Suren v. Zuege,
which holds that, 'A police officer driving a motorcycle at a speed of
forty to fifty miles an hour in pursuit of a fleeing automobile, without
signaling his approach and intention to pass a vehicle ahead, is guilty
as a matter of law, of contributory negligence, precluding a recovery
for injuries sustained in a collision with such vehicle as it turned to
the left.'
In regard to overruling the above case, the court has this to say; "To
announce a rule in this case different from that in the Suren Case
would make our law a mere matter of 'speculation on the part of trial
judges. Innumerable cases would arise where the trial judge would
be at a loss to know whether the situation was covered by the Suren
Case or by this one. It is quite plain that these two cases should be in
harmony."
AL WATSON '28
Negligence: Landlord May Not Create Trap on Premises and
Induce Tenant to Use It to His Injury: Limits of Simple Tool
Doctrine.
That the owner may not make a trap or snare on his premises, and
so induce his tenant to use it as to cause him injury, appears to be
well established in the recent case of. Woodruff v. Ellenbecker.1 .
This case is an action for injuries received by. the plaintiff by reason
of the cover of a box, used for the deposit.of rubbish, falling upon said
plaintiff and injuring her seriously. The said -box -was about two and
one-half feet high and was set against a shed in the rear. of a, cottage
on the -defendant's premises. , .
The plaintiff was the defendant's tenant and the box was necessarily
used for the deposit of rubbish. On top of the box was a -cover with
hinges, and this cover when opened'would rest against thie'side of
the shed and when closed, pitched downward.
The. plaintiff, prior to her injury, had occupied the premises of the
'Section 85.16 sub (3) Statutes of 1925.'
"Police officers shall be exempt from the speed limitations and other regu-
lations of highway traffic while actually in pursuit of a criminal or attempting to
apprehenid a person who is violating any other provision of this'chapter; .. .
'2T5 N.W. 816 Wis. Decided Nov. 8, 1z7.
NOTES AND COMMENT
defendant for about eight years. She had used this box during that
time. During all that time, the cover when raised, leaned back against
the shed to such an extent that it would stay open. Some time prior
to the accident, the cover became in need of repair and was repaired
by the defendant. In making such repairs the defendant placed the
hinges further back toward the shed so that the cover when raised
would fall back on the box unless very carefully adjusted. When the
repairs were made the plaintiff was away from home and didn't know
of such repairs, and when raising the cover of the box as she had
heretofore done, the cover fell back on her and injured her. The alle-
gations of the complaint charge that the repairs were negligently made,
and that the defendant failed to notify the plaintiff of the change in the
construction.
The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground that one
is never obliged to give warning of what is perfectly obvious and it is
obvious that if you lift up that cover it is going to fall down unless
you hold it or prop it up. Also, that one is bound to see and perceive
what is entirely manifest on obsefvation and that one making repairs
is not bound to assume that any one is not going to look what they
are doing, and hence cannot be guilty of negligence.I The Supreme Court in reversing the judgment of the lower court,
states that such court obviously overlooked the fact that even though
such contrivance was simple by reason of the manner in which it was
made, and used by the plaintiff bvei a long period of time, the cover
would stay up when raised, and that after the repairs were made the
cover was so changed that it would fall down unless held up.
The plaintiff, having had no warning of the change in construction,
if was not readily obvious t6 "her that the change had been made, and
it was natural for her to assume" thbt the cover would stay up as it
had in years gone by. The most simple contrivance may constitute
a dangerous trap or snare to the person 'using it, not because of its
simplicity, but because of hidden danger therein.
2
Licensees and invitees opfthe premises of the owner are entitled
to protection against an ordinary simple contrivance, if by reason of
its construction and location, it conceals a defect or danger.3
It has also been held that, where a flagman has usually been main-
tained at a crossing, his' withdrawal without notice to the public may
in and of itself constitute a want of ordinary care, because "the traveler
might in this way be lured into danger, when, if there had been no
'flagman kept there, lie would not have looked *for such a -signal, but
would have looked and listened for other signs of an approaching
train."
-The principles in the cases' stated are applicable to this case. The
plaintiff had been using thisbox for a long period of time, when it was
so constructed that the cover would stay up without being fastened,
2 Raether v. Mentor, 142 Wis. 238.
OBrinilson v. Chicago and. N.W.R.C. 144 Wis. 614. Zetley v. Jame Realty Co.
i85 Wis. 205. Lehman v. Amsterdam Coffee Co. 146 W. 213.
"Burns v. North Chicago Rolling Mills Co. 65 Wis. 312. Gundlach v.' Chicago
and N.WT.R. Co. 172 Wis. 438.
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and then the landlord, without her knowledge and without any warning
to her, changed the condition of the cover so that it would not stay
up as before. The plaintiff had been lured into a danger that was not
necessarily obvious to her.
This case is distinguished from what is known as the "pinch-bar'
case," and the "step-ladder case."'  In those cases the plaintiffs had
used the mentioned instrumentalities and were injured. The court
points out that in those cases neither of the plaintiffs were lured into
using the contrivances, and such instrumentalities were being used for
the first time, and a simple inspection would have disclosed the de-
fects, and it would not be natural for the plaintiffs to assume that
such contrivances were safe. The question of negligence and con-
tributory negligence under the facts, presented a jury question.
GEORGE J. UHLAR
Workman's Compensation: Municipal Corporation: What Con-
stitutes Premises of Employer."
Caravella, a Milwaukee street cleaner, while on his way to work
and actually traversing a street on which he would have worked later
during the day, was struck and killed by an automobile. His widow,
Frances Caravella, brought this action to recover compensation for
the death of her husband.
The Court held: that the death of an employee, while on his way
to work on the employer's premises, but not growing out of the services
incidental to his employment, is not compensable under the Workmen's
Compensation Act.
A master is liable for the injuries to his employee occurring within
the scope of his employment and while the employee is under the ac-
tual and constructive control of the employer.2 The relation of Master
and Servant must be in existence at the time of injury or death, al-
though the duty to protect the servant is not "necessarily confined to
the precise period during which servicek~are actively rendered."3
The relation of Master and Servant may also exist by custom.'
It had been customary for the deceased to go to work much earlier
than was necessary, and on his way to work he often picked up refuse
from the street and collected it in a pile which he would move after
reporting for work. If these had been the circumstances on the morn-
ing when the accident occurred, it is likely that the court would have
been justified in allowing compensation for the death, because it would
have occurred on the premises of the employer and during the render-
ing of "service growing out of and incidental to his employment."'
On this particular morning, however, deceased was on the street as
Holt v. C. M. and St. P. R. Co. 94 Wis. 596.
Borden v. Daisy Roller Mill Co. 98 Wis. 407.
'Caravella v. City of Milwaukee, 215 N.W. 911; -Wis. -.
2 71 Ala. 188.
2 184 S.W. 359.
& 140 Wis. 440.
163 Wis. 31; 102.03 (2) Statutes.
